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Philosophy, Politics, and Law Final Regarding Justice and Various Philosophers

For over 2500 years, philosophers have debated on such issues as rights, reality, freedom, and justice. In all of those years, one decision on what is meant by these terms has never been set in stone; a final definition - or answer - has never been reached. Therefore, when someone asks the philosopher, or even one who has merely studied philosophy, what justice is, or what any of the other terms mean exactly, there is typically not one answer that is prevalent to all. Indeed, if there is one common answer, it is 'I do not know.' However, while some people would argue that, since we have not come to a conclusion in all that time, perhaps there is no one set answer, others would say that there is indeed, in fact, an answer and it needs to be found. For this paper, I will be discussing why I believe that the question of what justice is has been answered, to some extent, by showing some of the commonalities of some of the philosophers that we have read this semester.

It is my belief that justice is doing what is congruous with your rights and duties as set out by your relationships with others. That is, if people do what they are allowed to do - doing what they have a right to do - and do not do what they have a duty not to do, then they are acting in a just way. The way in which we gain these rights and duties is by our interaction with other people.

For example, in Hobbes' Leviathan, Hobbes talks about the state of nature, in which man lives in fear, as there is only chaos. If any man wants what another has, he merely kills, or incapacitates, the individual who has what he wants. Hobbes tells us that it is only by choosing someone, or something, to lead over them, can people live in peace. This watcher will keep each individual in check, as each individual will know that if he steps out of line, then each other individual will join together against him.

Locke points out this same idea. Without forming together and formulating some laws by which everyone should abide by, each person will have to watch out for themselves, and their own interests. However, once a contract has been set up, each individual can fulfill their desires, as long as they are not stopping anyone else from fulfilling their respective desires. Not only that, but by forming together, many things that were hard for one person to do by himself now become much easier. That is, individuals are now able to specialize and therefore become better at what they can do.

Later, Kant, in On the Common Saying: "This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice," states that rights are those things which restrict "each individual's freedom so that it harmonises with the freedom of everyone else" (782). In other words, Kant is telling us to act in the same way that we would want everyone else to act. Therefore, it appears as though these three philosophers have come to the same basic idea, that individuals have interests that they wish to fulfill and that the only plausible way to fulfill those interests is to join together with each other in order to protect their ability to do so.

Unfortunately, some people would not act in this way, because they have not yet realized the truth of the things that Hobbes and Locke have pointed out, about the state of nature. Namely, that if one does not act in the way prescribed above then they are destined to be attacked by people that feel the same way, but are stronger. It is then the state that shows these individuals that what they wish is in fact not what they really want.

In fact, if we look at Machiavelli's writing, The Prince, we see that Machiavelli is more interested in how the Prince should run his kingdom then if he should be just to his people. Furthermore, if we look at many of the things that Machiavelli suggests, they may be called unjust by many philosophers, because the state is acting in a way that the people under it are not respected as the individuals who first allowed the power to step into play. Therefore, one of the reasons that Machiavelli doesn't go into justice is because he does not believe that politicians always need to care about justice, but that they should instead care about keeping their power. Machiavelli also shows us what has been stated above, that people do not often realize that they should act in the way that Kant prescribes. After all, Machiavelli is writing this in order to gain some prestige in the eyes of the rulers. Therefore, Machiavelli can give us little insight into how we come upon what justice is, as he is looking only to improve his own standing, but he can give us insight why a state is important, as well as what it should not be like.

Machiavelli and Hobbes, and perhaps even Plato, argue that the leader, or the state, is inviolable. Hobbes argues against revolution by the people, and Machiavelli would probably argue that those in power should do whatever they can do to stay in power. On the other hand, Locke and Kant do not agree with this. The state should serve the best interests of those whom it watches over, and, should the people that it watches over wish, they may break from the contract - even through revolution.

Hegel and Marx also play a somewhat limited role in the debate over what justice is. Hegel argues that the philosopher cannot make policies, and therefore makes an argument against Plato's idea of the 'Philosopher King'.

One of the questions that has not yet been resolved concerns who exactly will lead the people. Even if one allows the fact that people sign into a contract of sorts in order to be able to do what they want, as long as it does not stop another from doing what they want, there still is the question of who will lead. Plato, in the Republic, argues that it is the philosopher who is best suited to fulfill this function. Therefore, the question of who should rule is brought to the front.

Marx also asks a similar question. While Marx is specifically talking about the workingman's revolution against the business owners, his words have some importance. For example, Marx raises the question of whether the whole 'state of nature' story is just that, a mere story. Marx also argues against Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Plato, in that revolution should be allowed by the people.

Therefore, we have so far come to some vastly differing conclusions. Every philosopher that we have looked at would probably believe that everyone has some desires that they wish to fulfill. Also, there either was an original state of nature, as told by Hobbes and Locke, or there was not. If there was not a state of nature, then it is merely a story that is being used to get the people to believe what those in power want the people to believe, as Marx believes. If there was indeed a state of nature, then it was either brutish, as Hobbes tells us, or it was not, as Locke tells us. Either way, Hobbes and Locke both tell us that we, the people, entered into a contract to remove ourselves from the state of nature, and enter into a society.

According to Plato, the society should be run by a philosopher, who is also the king. However, Hegel argues that the role of the philosopher is to look to the past and talk to others about the conclusions that he reaches. However, the philosopher does not have the ability to talk about the future, merely the past. After all, the philosopher seeks the truth, and one can only know if some policy was the correct one after seeing how things turned out. Therefore, if the philosopher were to make a policy, as Plato's Philosopher King would have to do, and the policy ended up being the wrong policy, then the Philosopher King is no longer a true philosopher.

In fact, if we do not allow the philosopher to search out the leader, if we only allow him to speak to those that will listen, than we can effectively deal with Machiavelli's philosopher, who acts more like a puppet master - pulling the strings of those in charge to gain some prestige - then a philosopher.

Of course, then the question becomes, if the philosopher believes that his theory is correct, why can't he try to convince others? After all, most people believe that the truth is good and that if someone knew the truth, but wasn't sharing it with others, that that person would be acting unjustly.

The main goal of a philosopher is to find the truth. One of the truths that has yet to have been found is what justice is. However, I have argued that combining the theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Kant, along with the consideration of Plato, Machiavelli, Hegel, and Marx, can lead to a definition of what justice is. To sum up, I believe that justice is performing your rights and duties, as per Kant's writings. However, some sort of power to watch over the involved individuals is necessary. In addition, the power too must be watched over as well, so that it does not become a hindrance to any individual.

Of course, there are others who will disagree with my conclusions, and this is the fundamental problem that keeps popping up. As we have seen, while Plato, or Kant, or any other philosopher, may believe that they have the correct answer to the philosophical question that they are pursuing, there will always be someone else, such as Hegel or Marx, who will either come along and say that what they believe is nonsense, because there is a different way to look at the problem, or that what they are suggesting is merely a story and cannot be proven, one way or another, and therefore cannot be the truth.

So, while I set out to find what justice is, I cannot say that I have. Instead, I have found a 'working' definition that works for me, but one that others may not agree with. Of course, if I were to come across another definition, one that was superior to the one that I now hold, then I would examine the new definition, and perhaps take it as my own. After all, is that not what the philosopher is supposed to do?

Bibliography:

Steven M. Cahn, Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy (Oxford, 2002).

Notes

Created: December 17th – 18th 2002

Modified: February 13th 2004; February 5th 2005

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Husserl's Phenomenological Epoché and Theory of Intentionality

Edmund Husserl, in his Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, begins by discussing natural cognition and experience. Husserl explores experience, believing that experience is how we view the world around us. However, it is not enough to know that experience gives us insight. According to Husserl, we must, primarily, know how we are conscious of the world around us, before we can talk about the actuality of what we see.

Husserl, in this book, hopes to explain his phenomenological epoché, or reduction, as well as show just how important the epoché, and his theory of intentionality, are to experience and knowledge. For this paper, I will discuss the epoché, both how it works as well as its purpose in Husserl's theory. Also, I'll be using Husserl's theory of intentionality to show how it works into this. Hopefully, the importance of what Husserl is doing will be shown by the end of this paper.

The nature of Husserl's theory necessitates that examples are used to explain particular points. Therefore, it will be necessary to use examples in this paper. For our first example we will take these pieces of paper that this paper is printed on. Now, when you look at these papers, when you physically turn your eyes to them, you are paying attention to the pieces of paper, you are conscious of them. Husserl also uses the words 'intending', and 'grasping' in place of 'paying attention' to mean the same general idea.

So, when Husserl states that "physical things are intended to not only in perception but also in memories" (71), he is telling us that not only can you look upon the pieces of paper with your eyes, and perceive them that way, but you can also intend them in your mind. For example, you can look at these pieces of paper, and say some statement about them, such as 'these papers are white with black writing'. However, you can also put these papers into a folder, and, using your memory, recall what they look like, and say that 'those papers were white with black writing'.

In both examples above you are stating some perceived fact about an object. That is, in the first example you are making a statement about objects that are sitting in front of you, while in the next example you are making a statement about objects that you are recollecting. Later, Husserl will use particular words to describe each of the features of the act of perceiving something.

First of all, Husserl brings the Ego into perception and consciousness. The Ego is that which either a) grasps, b) maintains in grasp, or c) releases from grasp that which is being paid attention to, or that which you are intending. For example, using the example above, the Ego grasps, or pays attention, to the sheets of paper. Now, if you're paying attention to both the table that the papers are laying on in addition to the papers themselves, you maintain your consciousness of the papers, but also pay attention to the table. Therefore, your Ego is grasping the table, and maintaining the papers in its grasp. Now, if you no longer want to pay attention to the sheets of paper lying on the table, but would rather pay attention to the table itself, by itself, then your Ego releases the papers from its grasp, and maintains its grasp on the table. To continue further, perhaps a few moments after you begin to study the table, a door is slammed shut, or opened, and you turn to look in the general direction. Whatever it is that you are now paying attention to, perhaps the closest door, is now your primary concern. Perhaps you no longer even remember what you were doing before, and therefore, the table is no longer in the grasp of the Ego - it is no longer maintained in the Ego's grasp.

What this basically amounts to is a general theory of how individuals pay attention to that which they are studying. In the example above, first the papers were looked at, then the papers in relation to the table, then, the focus was moved solely to the table, and finally the door was looked at because of an abrupt noise. So, first one thing was the focus of the attention, and then two objects were, then just one, and finally another, different object. However, there is a constant movement from one object to another. Therefore, any individual always has at least one object that they are paying attention to at any time. Also, the object does not necessarily need to be a physical thing, as, as stated above, memories can also be objects of regard.

Now, before I turn to the next topic, I will introduce a new example. For this example, we will take an individual sitting at his desk, on which lies a soda can. Now, using the example above with the sheets of paper on the table as our guide, let's take a look at what this individual may be thinking.

First of all, let us imagine that the individual is looking at the soda can. Now, the individual might be thinking about its properties or characteristics. For example, perhaps the soda can is red with white writing on it. The individual can also see that it is slightly shiny and that it is open. Now, while the individual is thinking this, they are probably holding the belief that the object that they see, that they perceive, is what they are describing. That is, they would probably be pretty surprised if someone were to say that the can is really blue, because they see a red can. However, let us put that aside for a moment. Now, let us say the individual, who we will designate as P, has been sitting in the same position while looking at this can before him. Now, each of his experiences of the soda can have been from the same general side of the can. That is, P hasn't rotated the can, but has merely focused on the one original view.

Now, perhaps there is writing on the can that starts on the side of the can that he presently viewing, but that continues onto a side that he cannot see from his current position. Now, based upon previous cans that P has seen, or based upon his previous experiences with words and writing, P may believe that the writing continues onto the sides that he cannot see. Also, P may believe that the red color continues onto the other sides, and that the can will be shiny on the other sides, as well.

However, P cannot be sure that his intentions, namely that the can is going to be red and shiny on the sides that he cannot see and that the words will continue until they make a full word, or complete sentence, are correct until he looks at the other sides. So, P decides to turn the can ninety degrees to look at another side of the can. After P has turned the can ninety degrees, he finds that indeed he was correct. The writing continues on, and as does the red color and the shiny look of the can. Now, Husserl calls each new look at an object of consciousness, in this case the can, an adumbration. With each new adumbration, or look, at an object, our knowledge of the object becomes more and more clear or adequate in that we know more about the object that we are examining, and we are less likely to be missing some essential information about it.

Now, after looking at this side of the can, P can still not be sure that his idea of the can, as being red and shiny all over and whatever else he perceives the can to have as characteristics, is true on the other sides that he has not yet experienced. So, P turns the can ninety degrees yet again. However, after rotating the can P finds that this side has an ashy residue, and is more yellow then red. Therefore, P has now learned that the can is not as he first believed it to be - red and shiny all over - but instead has a characteristic that he would have missed had he not rotated it enough. This goes along with what Husserl tells us about experience and objects. Only by continually looking at something with new and different perspectives can the perceiver ever know whether their intention of the thing is adequate or not. So, while P's intention of the can was red and shiny all over, his intention of the can was inadequate, in that the can is not red and shiny all over.

Perhaps, P continues to look at the can even further, now knowing that his original intention of the can was incorrect, and wishing to find out more. Perhaps, after another ninety degree rotation, the can flickers and disappears, leaving a circular device. P may now realize that the can was merely an illusion created by some kind of projector. However, the realization of illusion need not even be realized right away. Possibly after that last mentioned rotation, the can is how P believes it will continue - that is, it is like the first two sides of the can. However, a few years later, the can is shown to be merely a projection when the battery runs out in the circular projector device. Therefore, this shows but one example of how we cannot be sure that what we intend an object as is really is how it is.

We can also take another example, which most people have probably experienced at one time or another. While walking down the street, or sitting down somewhere and watching people go by, you see someone that you know. You call out to them, and find that they look towards you. However, while they get closer, and perhaps after halving the original distance, you realize that it is not who you thought it was. However, after they are within a few feet of the individual, you find that it is indeed the person that you originally thought it was, and you were indeed correct in your original intention.

Looking at these examples, Husserl would say that they show that we can never really know whether something really exists, nor whether something is actually what we intend it to be. Indeed, this brings up the exact point that Husserl wants to make. Husserl does not really want to work with whether what we see as real is real, but rather Husserl wants to be able to understand intentionality. That is, while we may find out eventually, after further adumbrations of the 'matter' that we are conscious of, that the thing does not actually exist, we have still perceived it at some point in time as real. That is, in the example above, P still perceived the soda can, even though it wasn't actually there. He had an intention of the soda can as really existing, even though P found that it didn't really exist after he had experienced it further.

Husserl, in this book, wishes to understand how it is that we perceive anything and how we can learn to know that what we perceive is as we believe it to be or not. For example, Husserl, in his reduction, asks us to bracket, or put off to the side, questions and determinations of the reality of the object that we perceive. Husserl tell us that "we [phenomenologists] put out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence of the natural attitude; we parenthesize everything which that positing encompasses with respect to being: thus the whole natural world which is continually 'there for us', 'on hand,' and which will always remain there according to consciousness as an 'actuality' even if we choose to parenthesize it." (61)

Therefore, the epoché is that which allows us to exclude, for the most part, predetermined judgements (as those from science and past experiences) so that we can be free from previously placed restrictions. When we are free from past experiences, we no longer just give newly seen objects characteristics that we have seen in similar objects, but rather, we search for what the object really is. For example, when we see something, then we usually believe that it is real. However, that may not be the case, as it may in fact be an illusion.

Now, the question is: 'How does psychology fit into this?' After all, psychology deals with mental processes and behavior, much like phenomenology. For example, psychology is used to show why P, in the example above, feels the way that he does about the soda can. In other words, psychology uses knowledge of the subject to learn why they feel the way about the object that they perceive and why and they perceive it as they do. Psychology makes a judgement about the object, however. That is, psychology does not bracket, or parenthesize, whether any of the things perceived are real or not. Psychology instead deals with why characteristics are given to the object by the subject, with what mental events lead to the characteristics.

Phenomenology, on the other hand, has more of a relation to any and all mental events, for any and every consciousness, or Ego. So, to take the example of P and the soda can above, and to add on to it, let us imagine that another individual, R, comes in to P's area, after leaving his area, and looks at the same soda can that P was looking at. There would be some events that occurred for P that R would also experience. For example, both would have an experience of some object, O, which is a soda can in our example. However, O would not necessarily appear to be the same to both of them. P could have some experiences, such as the experiences from his previous adumbrations, which R would not necessarily have. However, R could always perform the same steps as P, and possibly, come upon approximately the same experiences.

So, it is important to point out that while they both perceive the same object, O, they may not have the same intention of the object. Even if they both have the intention that the soda can before them is red and shiny, what they mean by that is not the same thing. However, they can both do similar things with their experiences. For example, they can both have reflections upon their experiences. After they turn their attention to something else, they can still call up a memory, a reflection, of the object that they had just seen. Of course, the object of their individual reflections will probably not be the same as well, because of their different original experiences.

In other words, we have an object before us. We experience the object, and have some data that we experience from the object. These experiences, these senses or meanings, which the Ego grasps, are what Husserl calls noemata. From each experience, or each adumbration, the Ego grasps a noema. These noemata are then organized and put together by what Husserl calls the Ego. The organized and interpreted information is what Husserl calls noeses. Husserl believes that there is an internal and external world, as well as a world that is neither internal nor external. The external world is where the soda can, in our example, is, while the internal world is where the different noeses are. This shows that noeses are based up the individual, and therefore more personal, than objects themselves are. Noemata, on the other hand, are somewhere else. Noemata are the meanings or sense bestowed upon the object, and, according to Husserl, can be experienced by more then one individual, more then once. Because noemata can be repeated, P has the ability to speak of the soda can that he is experiencing with R as the same soda can that he was experiencing before R came into the room.

If anything, phenomenology is more of a way of determining the nature of reality, as well as how the mind can know things, whether the things are physical or mental. In this way, as well as in other ways, phenomenology is more like metaphysics. Phenomenology requires that phenomenologists, as well as other individuals, realize a few things. The first thing that must be realized is that the objects we perceive may or may not have the properties that are attributed to them. The only way to know whether they do is to examine them and get more and more experience with them.

Also, it must be realized that value is not inherent in the object, but rather that the value is a direct result of the personal view of the individual. Objects may have value in that they are more or less like the ideal object, however, this can only really be found by experience and examination, and can only be 'given' to the object by the individual who is experiencing the object. Of course, one of the things that Husserl makes clear is that an object can never really be adequately known, whether it be physical or mental. The reason for this is the fact that any object can always have something else known about it, and in fact, can always be but a mere illusion.

Therefore, the main purpose of phenomenology appears to be a way of finding out not so much about the truth, but how we perceive and experience physical and mental things. It is through phenomenology that we can realize that we have a determined way of perceiving things, whether they are real or not, and it is through phenomenology that we can determine the way we perceive things.

The epoché plays an important part in phenomenology. The epoché sets predetermined ideals to the side, so that they do not cloud our judgement. It does something which is similar to that which an individual must do when he wants to learn about a different culture. If anyone wishes to truly understand another culture, all of the individual's previously determined feelings and values must be aside. The culture must be looked at neutrally as it is, not in comparison to any another culture.

While psychology is similar, in many ways, to phenomenology, they are not the same. Psychology lacks the epoché, and it is this that is the major difference between the two. Psychology looks at the world as real, while phenomenology makes no assertions either way. It is phenomenology, with the aide of the epoché, the transcendental reduction, that helps lead phenomenologists to pure metaphysics.

Bibliography:

Husserl, Edmund, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book (1913), tr. F Kersten, Martinues Nijhoff, The Hague, 1982.

Notes:

Created: December 9th – 16th 2002
Modified: February 13th 2004; February 5th 2005
Notes: See also my paper titled Epistemology: Paper on Husserl and Logical Investigations.

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Categories: article, philosophy

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The Increase of the Power of Man and Science as the Main Theme of the Nineteenth Century

The nineteenth century could be described as containing three major movements; Romanticism, Realism, and Modernism. Each movement has its own important features and major themes that have had an effect on the present day world. If I had to state one of the major themes of the entire nineteenth century, it would be the increase of the power of man and science.

The beginning of the nineteenth century saw writers such as Mary Shelley, with her work Frankenstein. In this book, the main character of the novel is Victor Frankenstein, a man of science, who believes that any of nature's faults can be fixed by the use of science. Victor sets out to conquer death - to create something that transcends nature - and succeeds. However, his creation soon ends up turning on him, and kills his friends and family. The story ends with the death of Victor, as well as the death of his creation. So, we see here the beginnings of scientific thought in literature, which will eventually be far more widespread.

For example, in the middle of the nineteenth century, we see the interest in evolution, as brought up by Charles Darwin. From Darwin's theory of evolution, that man has evolved from primate, which directly contradicted the prevalent religious view of creation by a higher power, we once again see a further increase in man's power. Man now knows that he is the driving force of his own existence; it is not merely some higher power which directs man.

The later period sees more of man's search for the truth through science, and an increase of man's power as his knowledge increases. Of course, the church, which was the main power over man in the earlier centuries, does its best to keep control. The Syllabus of Errors is released by Pope Pius, in an attempt to bring the sheep that is mankind back to the flock and shepherd. However, this attempt, along with similar attempts, is seen for what it is by the majority of man, as mere cries for help. Lourdes, and similar sites that were once considered sacred and attracted people because of the miracles associated with them, are seen as mere hysteria - in that they are seeing what they wish to see, and not what is actually occurring.

So, while there are a few people who still hold to the old beliefs, most of mankind is realizing that they have been deceived for too long. No longer will man let himself be controlled by a select few, whether they be Kings, slave owners, or priests, but rather they will learn to live life as they wish, and seek their own happiness, free from the old ways of coercion.

Therefore, it is my view that it is man's increase in knowledge and power over himself that is the main theme of the nineteenth century. The man of pre-nineteenth century was characterized by belief in the supernatural, while the man of the post-nineteenth century will be characterized by his belief in science and man's own ability to know the truth.

Update history

Created: December 5th – 15th 2002
Modified: February 4th 2004
See also my papers titled: Can Man and Society Exist Without Religion?; Dostoevsky’s Underground Man as the Creation of Society; Man’s Quest for Dominance over Nature within Frankenstein

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Categories: article, philosophy