James Skemp's StrivingLife

While the exact date of the foundation of Thebes, located 30 miles northwest of Athens in eastern Boeotia, has not been clearly established, ruins have been found dating back to 1300 B.C. (Wiseman, p.624). One of the reasons that so little is known about Thebes is that it doesn't play any major roles in history until the sixth century B.C. However, one myth concerning Thebes' origin does exist that is important to mention due to its inclusion of known figures of Greek tragedy.

According to this myth it was a barbarian, a term used by the Greeks for all non-Greeks, by the name of Cadmus, who founded the city of Thebes. Cadmus' father Agenor, bore three sons, Cadmus, Phoenix and Cilix, and one daughter, who was named Europa. Zeus, acting on his frequent desire for mortal women, became a bull and carried Europa off with him. Agenor tells his sons that they must either bring Europa back to him or never return themselves again. A consultation with the oracle at Delphi leads Cadmus to not seek Europa and the bull that took her (Zeus), but rather to found a city on the exact spot where a specific cow collapses in exhaustion. (Internet Source 1) Cadmus' importance in Greek tragedy becomes apparent in later works, especially the works of Sophocles. In his famous tragedy he tells of two individuals further down the birthline, named Antigone and Oedipus, who also still live in Thebes.

However, while Thebes played no major part in the rest of Greece before the sixth century B.C., it was the principal settlement in, "the large fertile region of Boetia." (Pomeroy, p. 85-6) This seems to have been one factor that allowed Thebes to not only control the area surrounding it, but also to deal with the neighboring cities on a somewhat equal stance, thereby having an important part in this region.

Thebes first really enters play around the early and mid sixth century B.C., when, under the leadership of Thebes, a Boeotian league is formed. (Pomeroy, p. 127) The driving force of the creation of this league was the presence of two other major powers in the area, the militaristic Thessaly and the Athenians. Another league was formed in 546 B.C., the Peloponnesian League, which contained Sparta and it's nearby allies, including Corinth, resulting in most of Greece being a part of one league or another.

Around 492 B.C. the Persians, lead by King Darius, send an expedition into Greece, by way of land to the north of Greece, to enter, and defeat, Athens, after Athens had helped the Ionians fight against Persia. Many of the island cities that the Persian force came upon, as well as mainland cities such as Thebes, yield to occupation. However, while Persia is able to get to Athens, due in part to the fact that Northern Greece puts up little resistance; however the Persians are later defeated at the Battle of Marathon in 490 B.C. (Pomeroy, p. 187-8) When Persia's next leader Xerxes sends another force into Greece around 482 B.C., Thebes, along with Thessaly, yields to Persia, leaving Athens and the Peloponnesian League with the responsibility of removing the Persian forces from Greece.

In order to unite the Greeks against any further attacks from Persia, the Delian League was set up in Delos in 477 B.C. and headed by Athens. This league would later become the Athenian League in 454 B.C. The Athenian League existed in opposition to the Peloponnesian League, which contained Sparta and it's allies, including Corinth. (Pomeroy, p. 204-6) While Thebes doesn't appear to have been a part of either league, it was drawn into the conflict between the two around 457 B.C., when Sparta and Corinth had joined forces to fight Athens in the Boeotia area. Instead of harming Athens, however, Sparta's action allows Athens to move into Boeotia and conquer much of the area, save Thebes. (Pomeroy, p. 213)

Thebes was able to hold itself out of first the Delian and then Athenian League until the league fell apart in 445 B.C., at which time Thebes resumed control of the Boeotian area. (Pomeroy, p. 215) Thebes reappears in Greek history in 431 B.C., when, as an ally of Sparta and the Peloponnesian League, it attacks Athens' ally Plataea, thereby starting the Peloponnesian War. (Pomeroy, p. 254) The quick temper of Thebes is apparent in 405 B.C. at the end of the war, when Thebes, as well as other allies of Sparta, advocate killing the Athenian men and selling the women and children into slavery. However, perhaps because Corinth and Thebes could gain quite a bit of power in the area if Athens was destroyed, the walls were instead brought down. (Pomeroy, p. 319)

Interestingly enough, around 403 B.C., Thebes and Athens have combined forces. After Athens' walls had been taken down, a group of thirty tyrants were set into place to rule over the Athenians. In addition, a great number of people were banned from returning to Athens. However, Thebes and Megara, another city near Athens but to the west, allow these Athenians shelter from the tyrants and their bloody and extreme actions. Because of Thebes and Megaras help, the Thirty Tyrants are eventually overthrown and removed from control of Athens by the banned Athenians. (Pomeroy, p. 322-3)

Sparta, which became the dominant power in Greece after Athens' fall and had set up the Thirty Tyrants in Athens, suffered alienation after the Tyrants downfall and eventually collapsed much the way Athens did. (Pomeroy, p. 322, 333) In 395 B.C., Sparta's previous allies united against it, waging various wars until around 371 B.C. In 382 B.C., after the first round of conflict, the Corinthian War, had ended, Thebes was eventually captured by Sparta, due to a pro-Spartan Thebian faction. However, with the help of Athens, the Spartan garrison stationed at Thebes was eventually ousted, in 379 B.C. (Pomeroy, p. 337)

Later, after joining with Athens, informally in 377 B.C. and formally in 375 B.C., Thebes was able to defeat Sparta on the battlefield in 371 B.C. Then, in that same year, Thebes marched into Spartan territory and freed the Messenians from Spartan control. Eventually, however, the leader that had made a great deal of this possible, Epaminondas, was killed in battle and revolts within the Thebes/Athens alliance tore it apart. (Pomeroy, p. 333) Even if Epaminondas would have lived, he had no real plans for the future other then, following in the footsteps of Athens and Sparta, the desire to unite Greece under their control.

Thebes was able to gain territory to it's north, which eventually resulted in fighting against the Macedonians around the 370's B.C. and in Thebes taking Philip II hostage between 369 B.C. and 367 B.C., before he was ruler. Philip's capture and the resulting time spent in Thebes had a great impact on Philip, as well as Greece itself. Philip's time spent in Thebes, in addition to learning about Greek politics and fighting, would lead him to head back into Greece when he does become a leader. (Pomeroy, p. 377)

In the 350's B.C., Philip was asked by Thebes and Larisa to come to Greece to aid them in their conflict with Phocis and Pherae. Coming to the aid of his now allies, Philip took over Thessaly in order to secure a foothold in Greece. (Pomeroy, p. 381) While Philip was taking over Thessaly, Phocis had sacked the treasures of Delphi in order to free itself from the corner in which Thebes had backed it. Thebes again asked for Philip's help with Phocis, and Philip eventually intervenes in 347 B.C. While fighting against Phocis with Thebes, Philip also was offering Phocis terms by which it could surrender and, in 346 B.C., Phocis accepted the terms. In this way, Philip was not only able to gain some level of respect from Thebes, but was also able to increase the power and territory of Macedon. (Pomeroy, p. 382)

Philip, having quite a hold in northern Greece, then continued further into Greece, and conquered a mostly Theban and Athenian contingency sent out to hold Philip off in 338 B.C. This, in turn, led to Philip eventually gaining control of all of Greece not too long thereafter, as well as the destruction of Thebes two years later. (Pomeroy, p. 387)

Having read the above history of Thebes, it's fairly easy to make at least a couple comments about Thebes. First of all, Thebes is extremely ambitious, always seeming to want more and more, yet, knowing, such as in the case of Persia's invasion, when not to push too hard to get more then what you have. Tying in with this, like many other states and leagues at this time, Thebes wants power and will do whatever it takes to get it, even if it means befriending states that it had previously fought against, or even argued for the complete destruction of. For example, after Athens' conquest at the hands of Sparta, we see Thebes calling for Athens' complete destruction. Yet, a short while later, Thebes is helping build Athens' walls and is fighting on the field against the same enemy as Athens. Of course, we see this with various other groups as well, such as when Persia comes to the aid of Sparta, so perhaps Thebes isn't too unlike any other Greek state at this time.

While I would also like to conclude from the history of Thebes above that it's a strong military force, I'm afraid I can't really say that. It's true that Thebes was a great military power while under the command of Epaminondas, which allowed them to liberate various parts of Sparta's territory, but Epaminondas was the only real thing that Thebes had going for it. Comparing Thebes to Sparta, for example, we see that Spartan troops are considerably stronger - that each individual man is strong - and that a good general only adds to Sparta's strength. On the other hand, based on Thebes' previous history of allowing Persia to pretty much walk past them, the strength of Thebes is not in its individuals, but rather in it's leaders. In this way, Thebes is much like Athens, in that while Athens had a great navy, the true strength of Athens is in its thinkers and generals.

However, even though I don't believe that Thebes was a great military force, perhaps the greatest event of Thebes' history was when it's military defeated Sparta. Of course, Thebes attack on Plataea in 431 B.C. was certainly important, in that it started the Peloponnesian War, but, as I stated above, I attribute this more to impatience, as well as resentment, then to any kind of military strategy. When you add to this the fact that Thebes wanted Athens completely destroyed after the war, I think the case for the attack being based on resentment is sufficiently backed. Yet, that is not to say that there wasn't some justification for why Thebes wanted Athens destroyed, as it was Athens that took away and controlled much of Boeotia during the war. Athens was certainly a threat to their region, so it would make sense to try to remove that threat when possible.

Keeping this in mind, we actually see that this explains why Thebes, and any other city in Greece, would form alliances one minute and put them aside the next. After all, as we've already seen from the above, Sparta becomes a threat to Thebes, albeit not a very serious one to their city but rather to their path to power, so Thebes joins with Athens in order to deal with Sparta. Alliances, or in fact any outside influences, are only good if they are acting in the cities best interests.

Tied with this, it's interesting that Thebes' most important event, being in control of Greece, is exactly what its downfall was as well. It is because Thebes and every other city is so concerned with themselves, and seek alliances that conform with their needs, that they fall due to these very ways. It's unfortunate that Epaminondas dies before Thebes is able to secure it's hold over Greece, in that perhaps Thebes could have accomplished what Sparta and Athens were unable to do. However, I find it highly unlikely that any power could reign supreme, without having some external force driving Greece to unification.

So, to wrap up, I suppose Thebes' most significant moment was it's rise to power, which, I hold, was based on Epaminondas and the current state of affairs in Greece, most importantly that all of the other major powers were not so major anymore. Thebes, like any other city in Greece at this time, was seeking the glory and power of being the controllers of Greece, using alliances in order to secure ways of doing this, and for no other reason.

Bibliography:

S. Pomeroy et al., Ancient Greece: A Political, Social and Cultural History, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Wiseman, James R. "Thebes." Encyclopedia Americana: International Edition, 1990 Edition.

Cadmus - Founder of Thebes - Grandfather of Dionysus and Pentheus, http://ancienthistory.about.com/library/weekly/aa050801a.htm (Accessed November 13th 2003)

Modification history

Created: November 13th – 18th 2003
Modified: December 1st 2003

Michael Dawson, in his book Understanding Cognitive Science attempts to provide a basic understanding of cognitive science, specifically by dealing with and using the "tri-level" hypothesis. For this paper, I will be discussing the tri-level hypothesis and what it tells us about cognitive science.

One of the major problems in any science is the problem of discussing the findings within a set field with people outside of the field. Because of this problem, time is instead spent on some lesser subjects, such as sports and the weather. According to Dawson, cognitive science doesn't have to deal with this problem as much as some other fields in science do. Cognitive science brings various fields/disciplines together into one, overbearing, field, dealing with something along the lines of "'representation of knowledge, language understanding, image understanding, question answering, inference, learning, problem solving, and planning.'" [1: 3] Three fields or disciplines that Dawson speaks of when he talks about the foundations of cognitive science are the fields of psychology, philosophy, and computer science. We will see shortly that these three fields each have some specific part in the tri-level hypothesis.

The fundamental assumption of the cognitive science field is that "'the human mind is a complex system that receives, stores, retrieves, transforms, and transmits information' ... in short, the mind is assumed to be an information processor." [1: 5] From this assumption, which may or may not be true, Dawson, and other cognitive scientists, move towards something resembling the tri-level hypothesis. This hypothesis holds that there are three levels of analysis when we discuss information processing. The first level is the computational level, the second the algorithmic level, and the third is the implementational level. Of course, the ordering of the levels is based solely on what we would like to focus on in our studies. For the rest of this paper, I'll attempt to stay away from ordering the levels, and instead just call them what Dawson calls them.

As I mentioned before, each of the three fields Dawson speaks of in this introduction can be shown to mirror a particular level. The implementational level is where cognitive scientists ask, "What physical properties are used to implement the (functional) method that the system uses to solve this information-processing problem?" [1: 288] The field of psychology asks these kinds of questions, and people of this field are therefore best prepared for examining this particular area.

The algorithmic level is where cognitive scientists ask, "What method is the system using to solve this information-processing problem?" [1: 288] The field of computer science, specifically those in the field of programming, asks these kinds of questions, and people of this field are therefore best prepared for examining this particular area. When we examine the steps that an information processor uses to come upon a solution we are looking at this level in the tri-level hypothesis.

The computational level is where cognitive scientists ask, "What information-processing problem is the system solving?" [1: 288] The field of philosophy asks these kinds of questions, and people of this field are therefore best situated for examining this particular area. When we examine the problem that the information processor is using certain steps to solve, we are looking at this level in the tri-level hypothesis.

It's important to note that Dawson presents a tri-level hypothesis, so, because of this, no single level tells the whole story of what cognition, or information processing, is. It is only by an examination of each particular question, along with an analysis of how each question relates to, and helps answer, each other question, that one can truly understand cognition.

On the surface, this hypothesis appears to be fairly valid. However, without looking at an example of an information-processor, we can't really make a solid judgment about the safety of Dawson's hypothesis. One concrete example in the cognitive science literature is the case of a thermostat. For the most part, the average man on the street believes that a thermostat is an information processor since it takes information from the environment and processes it in such a way that we can understand the environment. Of course, it should be noted that the average man on the street is not a cognitive scientist, so this may not be true. If we look at a thermostat in light of the tri-level hypothesis, we may be able to break it up into something such as the following.

A thermostat, as stated above, attempts to tell us what the temperature is of the environment that the thermostat lies in. This then would be the information-processing problem that the system is solving (what is the temperature of the environment) and would therefore lie in the computational level. The algorithmic level would be the particular program that the thermostat uses to take the information that it receives and process it so that an observer can see the temperature (perhaps by looking at a digital readout). The implementational level would be the actual physical makeup of the thermostat, including the readout and the information gatherers (such as a vial of some chemical).

The question is, does this tri-level hypothesis appear to make sense? It certainly seems as though it does. When we examine any machine that we have never seen before we must ask ourselves a few questions. First, we must ask ourselves what it looks like - we must examine it as a physical object. Secondly, we must attempt to determine how each physical part of this thing interacts with each other physical part - we must examine how it works. Thirdly, we must examine the output of the physical things operation to be able to determine what it does or what it gives from what it is given.

A typewriter, for example, looks a certain way - is physically a particular way (while at rest or while not being in operation). When we use the typewriter each piece interacts with each other piece in a particular way, which is determined by how the typewriter is made up (it's makeup prohibits the typewriter from acting in certain ways, but allows it to act in certain other ways). In addition, by inserting a piece of paper into the typewriter a certain way, and by using the typewriter in the way it was designed, we end with a piece of paper unlike the piece we inserted originally, in that the white sheet now contains black letters upon it (assuming of course that the paper was white in the first place and that we actually type some characters in - press some keys in/down).

Human cognition - information-processing by human beings - is not at all unlike our typewriter example. Human beings are designed (by nature or by the gods) to be a particular way physically. Specifically, our mind is set up in such and such a way, with particular properties and chemicals. In addition, our bodies, particularly our sense organs, are set up in a particular way. Together, united in a body, our senses work to gain information about the environment, including their (the senses') own place within the environment, by using some method or another, which our physical body has been set to carry out. Given this input, whatever it may be, we are then able to 'release' some output.

We could next ask what role philosophy plays in cognitive science, particularly when in the context of the tri-level hypothesis. To be quite honest, while philosophers are said to be particularly of interest in the computational level, cognitive science, to me, is more about the scientific aspect than the cognitive aspect. Most of the issues of cognitive science, from Dawson's perspective, are about the actual system itself - most importantly the physical object that is engaging in information processing and the method that the information-processor follows, or acts out.

While we could pay special attention to human cognition, to information processors that are human, the tri-level hypothesis opens up the field much wider then this. Of course, it's possible that money is a main factor that would drive cognitive scientists towards studying human beings, with the hopes that an artificial intelligence could be created that would process information exactly as a human being. One would hope, however, that if we indeed do have philosophers in cognitive science, which Dawson holds is the case, that they would at least drive cognitive science not only towards the moneymaking projects, but towards the enlightening projects as well.

Which brings us again to the question of whether philosophy has a determined place in cognitive science, even though people in this field are possibly more interested in, and driven by, science and money. One possible answer, which I have some interest in, is that cognitive science takes quite a bit from philosophy, and therefore philosophy plays some role, but, instead of following completely through with philosophy, branches off into practical application. Philosophers have been interested in how it is that human beings interact with the world for quite a while - how it is that I know that there is a particular object before me. The primary purpose of this was to determine what the world outside of a perceiver is like, as well as how this perceiving worked. By knowing how perception - information processing - works, we can determine how it is that we come upon the truth. Cognitive science is merely the quest for this, not so as to know how human beings (how each 'I') perceives for that in itself, so as to be able to replicate this processing in an artificial construct.

The role of philosophy in cognitive science is like the role of a mentor, in that an older system helps guide the development of a newer system by both laying the groundwork, as well as giving aid when necessary. Philosophers, being more imaginative, abstract, and creative people, help move cognitive scientists towards the generation of a physical system. Because of this, while philosophy is the main driving force behind the basic/fundamental striving of the cognitive science field, philosophers-as-philosophers have little place in the further abstractions of this system. Rather, it is the philosophical psychologists and philosophical computer scientists that play a major part in these later abstractions.

Bibliography:

1. Michael Dawson, Understanding Cognitive Science, Blackwell Publishers, 1998.

Notes

Created: November 30th 2003
Modified: December 8th 2003

I recently, while daydreaming yet again in a class, happened upon the phrase residing on the side of a McDonald's cup stating that "Change is Good". I, of course, am quite familiar with this saying, however, I was a tad confused. Because of this confusion, I decided that it would be best for me to go ahead and examine the saying "Change is Good" in order to see just what was meant by this saying. The following is my attempt at this.

Quite simply, and to borrow from http://dictionary.reference.com/, change (as a verb) is "to cause to be different". Change could also be (as a noun) "the act, process, or result of altering or modifying" or "something different; variety". Good, also from http://dictionary.reference.com/, is, well, quite a few things. Since 'good' is so dang hard to define, let us skip what 'good' is in this saying/statement, and instead focus on change (as a verb).

We could say that if some thing, A, changes into some thing B, then, in logical terms, A does not equal B, or that it is not the case that A is equal to B. This can be stated as (A ¹ B) or as [~(A ≡ B)]. Let us stick with the latter of the two, since it is more logical, in that it uses set logical symbols.

Now, keeping the above in mind, let us say that we can symbolize the change from A to B by 'Þ'. So, if A changes into B, then we can say that ( A Þ B). This should not be confused with 'implies', since A does not necessarily have to change to B. Rather, we are only talking about when A does change to B.

So, when we look at change, we look at the difference between A and B.

Now, let us try to tackle good, just in passing, even though it is so difficult to define (but B.F. Skinner and Nietzsche perhaps come close...). I think the common idea of good that is being mentioned in this statement is something like: change is for the best, or is valuable, or the final/changed-to thing (B in this case) is superior to the original thing (A in this case).

Again, to use logic, if A < B and B > A (if A is less then B and B is greater than/superior to A), then A Þ B (the change of A to B) is 'good'. Also, if A > B and B < A (if A is greater than/superior to B and B is less than A), then A Þ B (the change of A to B) is 'good'.

However, I think that what we really mean to say for our last example is that change is not 'good'. That is, if we change some object to something lesser then what it is, then we have traded something okay/good for something bad/not as good. However, if all change is good, which may or may not be the case, then change, no matter what our starting and ending point/object is good, necessarily.

In other words, saying that 'change is good' is not a good idea, since we leave things far too open ...

Instead of saying that 'change is good', we should instead say that 'change is good if what we end with is superior to what we started with'. However, even this definition is not very good.

For example, let us say that we change from A to B and then from B to C. In a way, we have changed from A to C (of course, there could be some objections to this, but, it is true in many cases, such as when you change one dollar to four quarters and four quarters to eight dimes and four nickels - we could easily say that we changed one dollar to eight dimes and four nickels, but, saying so would skip the middle step, which may or may not be important...). We could say that what we have done is A Þ B Þ C as well as A Þ C. Now, if 'change is good', and that is all, then (A Þ B) = (B Þ C) = (A Þ C) in that each change is good (of course, it's a good question on whether it should be '=' or '≡', but we'll leave that aside for the moment). We have no real way of knowing if one change is any better then any other change, at least from the statement that 'change is good'.

Now, let us say that A is less then B but that C is less than B [(A < B) · (C < B)]. If we follow from the above that if A < B then A Þ B is good, while if A > B then A Þ B is not necessarily good, then A Þ B is good but B Þ C is not necessarily good. In fact, we don't even know if A is superior to C or not (if A > C or A < C). It could be that if we take A and C together we still have something less then B. In such a case, while it's true that A Þ B is good, it would have been superior if we would have stopped at B, instead of changing to C (B Þ C).

But, let us move back to A Þ B Þ C where C > A and C > B. We said that we could say that this could be changed to A Þ C. However, we must deal with a problem here. Let us say that A > B and C > B. Let us even go so far as saying that A > B + A and C > B + C (where B + A or B + C is equal to 'B and A combined' or 'B and C combined'). In such a case the change to B is _really_ not good. If we attribute numbers to each number (to show this, where each number is the value of the changed to thing) we could have something like A (5) Þ B (-2) Þ C(7). In this case we would change from 5 to -2 (a change of -7) to 7 (a change of +9).

Of course, this assumes that the number is the total value, opposed to the number that we gain by changing from one to another. Let us say that we start at 0 and have something like the following instead. Þ A (+2) Þ B (-5) Þ C (+3)

That is, changing to A gives us 2, changing to B takes from us 5, and changing to C gives us 3. In this case, C is still superior to A and B and A is also superior to B. However, if we move to A, then to B, then to C, we end up going from 0 to 2 to -3 to 0. In this case it is not the same as moving to A and then to C, which would give us 0 to 2 to 5. Also, change is not, as we see above, necessarily good, as the saying that we have looked at seems to suggest.

In this case we also see that B alone removes any advantages that we may have gained from A and C, since we end up exactly where we have begun (at zero) if we follow through the complete steps. In addition, we haven't even looked at the fact that by changing to B we could have removed any chance of being able to change to C, or that C is contingent upon B happening. For example, we typically don't see disaster relief being handed out (C being a state of the world in which disaster relief is being handed out) without there being some disaster necessitating this (B being a state of the world in which some disaster has happened or is happening).

Of course, it's worth pointing out that some people believe that we end up exactly where we are at the end of all things anyways. That is, if we look at Schopenhauer, we see that this world is striving (changing) towards no goal in particular (towards no set telos) but rather towards any goal whatsoever - whichever goal is at hand. We see some thing before us and strive towards it, believing that it will change things for the better, and this is true for a short time, but, after a short while, we learn that we haven't really solved anything - we haven't really added anything to our current condition. Rather, all we have really done is keep ourselves busy for a short time (see On the Saying "Idle Hands Are The Devil's Tools") only to land in a state in which we must find yet another thing to keep us busy. In this way, perhaps, change is good in that it prevents boredom/stagnation, which could be seen as one and the same idea.

So, to conclude, 'Change is Good' is a flawed statement, and should not be relied upon for any reason whatsoever.

Notes

Created: November 24th 2003
Modified: November 26th 2003; December 1st 2003; February 5th 2005

Thanks to Gavin for pointing out some errors with the first version of this article.