James Skemp's StrivingLife

The reason I picked up Martin Heidegger's The Principle of Reason was quite simple - having read Arthur Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation and agreed with many of his points, I attempt to further my knowledge of his principles as much as possible. While Heidegger doesn't mention Schopenhauer a single time in his thirteen Lectures, nor in his Address, Schopenhauer certainly discusses the Principle of Reason, pulling off of Leibniz, and is therefore a blatant oversight of Heidegger's to not mention Schopenhauer at all. Whether this is unintentional one cannot know from simply the text, but for a German philosopher to not know another German philosopher who covered the same content is quite surprising, to say the very least.

Having read Heidegger's work, I can't say he's moved much beyond Schopenhauer. If this is what progress has given us since Schopenhauer's time, I can't say I'm too impressed with the progression. Nonetheless, Heidegger deserves to be mentioned, which is what I shall attempt to do here, in as few words as possible.

“The principle of reason reads: nihil est sine ratione. One translates it: nothing is without a reason. What the principle states is illuminating. When something is illuminating we understand it without further ado. Our understanding doesn’t labor on in order to understand the principle of reason. How is this so? It is because human understanding, whenever and wherever it is active, always and everywhere keeps on the lookout for the reason why whatever it encounters is and is the way it is. … The understanding demands that there be a foundation for its statements and assertions.” [1: 3]

Heidegger has already told the principle of reason, and will tell us at the beginning of the next handful of lectures. One must keep in my mind that these were lectures, and some level of content had to be reiterated over and over in order to make it stick in the minds of the individuals he was lecturing.

We should make note that Heidegger would like us to look at this principle from another perspective at many points in the series of lectures, namely from that of the affirmative, instead of the negative. Instead of simply looking at ‘nothing is without reason’, we should also examine ‘everything is with reason’. Yet, at this point Heidegger appears to get lost, almost seeming to believe that beings are only those things with reason – a form of intelligence. We must not allow Heidegger to take us on this path. While it is true that we can examine the principle from this direction, this is not how the principle is presented, exactly for this reason. We are not talking about what beings have, rather what they cannot not have – what they must necessarily have. We are not talking about reasoning – we are talking about justification and grounds.

Later Heidegger shows his inability to leave this kind of reason alone when he discusses the saying of Angelus Silesius: “The rose is without why, it blooms because it blooms…” [1: 36] Heidegger hear discusses what is best called ‘reflection’. The rose does not have reason because it does not reflect, yet it’s blooming does have reason – it’s very nature is it’s reason. He seems to accept that something can happen because it happened, which will end up causing no small trouble later, if the proposition is followed through. To say that a thing does something because it does something is as troublesome as looking for a first cause (which Heidegger does, and which devolves into x is x because x is x).

Heidegger will also ask us to place stress upon certain words of the phrase, which makes the phrase appear to belong only to human beings, or rational animals. We must not allow ourselves to go down this path either, for it leads down the same dark path I have just warned of above. If anything, we should attempt to eradicate the ‘reasoning mind’ from Heidegger’s discussion on the principle of reason. We are concerned with grounds and foundations, not reasoning of the mind.

Heidegger finds it interesting that the principle of reason doesn’t really tell us what ‘reason’ is, but rather states that everything that is has a reason for being the way it is. In addition, Heidegger accepts that the principle of reason is without reason, for as soon as we ask for the reason that the principle of reason is true, we affirm that the principle of reason is true – otherwise, why would we even bother asking for a reason if no reason was necessary?

Heidegger also points out that “[r]eason, which insists on its being rendered, at the same time requires that it, as a reason, be sufficient, which means, completely satisfactory. For what? In order to securely establish an object [Gegenstand] in its stance [Stand].” [1:33] Later, “reason must itself be sufficient”. [1:33] In other words, only when we clearly understand the reason behind an object’s existence do we understand the object. If any part of the reason is missing we are left with an incomplete object.

Yet, Heidegger also states that reason is like cause. This leads me to believe that, Heidegger is also pointing out that every effecting cause – every cause that has an effect – is perfect in that it is sufficient for an event/effect. If the cause were not sufficient, or perfect, there would be no effect. The problem that comes from this, though, is that every cause is perfect, and perhaps so too every effect. Certainly the causes could be no different. Yet, perhaps perfection here is not a universal perfection, in that it is the best, but rather a relative perfection, in that it is perfect in that it is sufficient (which all causes are).

Moving on, Heidegger shows that he understands the principle of reason, when he states that “[t]he principle of reason is, according to the ordinary way of understanding it, not a statement about reason, but about beings, insofar as there are beings”. [1:44] It’s good that Heidegger points this out, for there are a great many portions in the previous lectures where Heidegger himself seems to have lost this point of important information. Later Heidegger states, “the principle of reason says that to being there belongs something like ground/reason.” [1: 50] Stated another way, a being implies that there is a foundation or ground for the being’s existence. This being can be any object, material or nonmaterial, that is said to exist, and that has certain properties (“in an Object something which is thrown over against and brought to the cognizing subject simultaneously stands on its own” [1: 81]). A thought in my mind and a glass on a table both share at least one property – they have a reason they exist.

We could make a point, and Heidegger seems to lean in this direction slightly, that the only things that exist are, in a way, things brought to our consciousness. While there may be a glass sitting on a table in the other room, until I see the table and the glass upon it I do not know the existence of that state of affairs (the glass upon the table). “Subsequently, being reveals itself as objectness for consciousness, and this at once says: being brings itself to light as will.” [1: 65] It’s important to mention this, as well as Arthur Schopenhauer, for this seems to suggest that Heidegger has dabbled, at the very least, in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. I leave this point simply at this, for to draw any further discussion from this point would be to move from Heidegger to Schopenhauer in this article.

One could argue, as Heidegger points out, that Descartes also says something to the effect of “I place something as something in front of myself” [1: 77]. I think, I am: I doubt, I am. When I think of something as something – myself as doubtful – I place that idea at the front of my attention – I focus upon it and analyze it. This analysis attempts to find some reason, some answer to the questions of ‘Is this the case? Why?’ To not question is like saying the sky is green, but never attempting to even look at the sky – to say that there are fifteen elephants in the room on the other side of a wall, but not even look to make sure that there is a room on the other side of the wall (not to mention fifteen elephants within it). We, as rational animals, constantly look for “the sufficient ground of the objects of experience” insofar as we look for an explanation of what, how, and why, the object is what, how, and where, it is. [1: 78]

Moving onto Heidegger’s Address, we see another reiteration of the basics of the principle of reason. “Whatever happens to be actual has a reason for its actuality. Whatever happens to be possible has a reason for its possibility. Whatever happens to be necessary has a reason for its necessity. Nothing is without reason.” [1: 117]

Yet, it is important to note that it is not the reason, per se, that causes that which is to be. Rather, the principle of reason makes it clear to us, as rational animals, that everything that is is for some reason. The laws of nature do not dictate the laws of nature – rather the laws of nature explain why nature is as it is. Nature conforms only to itself – laws simply allow us to understand, and communicate, how nature works. It is the same for reasons, grounds, foundations, and justifications.

“[O]ne can always render as to why the matter has run its course this way rather than that.” [1: 119] It certainly seems as though the principle of reason applies to the past – we can only apply reasons to things that have already occurred. Certainly this is true. But, the repetition of certain events when certain factors are present means that reasons can be applied to future events as well. Since a caused b, it is highly probable that if a occurs, b will occur thereafter.

The final point, and an important one, is that the questioning of reasons/grounds allows no rest. Asking ‘Why?’ leaves us constantly striving towards an answer. Our only options are to continue after the answers to the unending questions, or to withdraw our question, leaving one answer as the final answer. Some will argue that the former is the best route. Some will argue that one can never reach infinity, and that we therefore ought to do the latter. Some will argue that we should do the former, but say that the former ends up being the latter (Heidegger even points to this when he mentions that Leibniz finds the first cause in God). Yet, to be honest, the principle of reason does not afford us this conclusion, for better or worse. Nothing is without reason.

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Bibliography:

1: Heidegger, Martin. The Principle of Reason. Translated by Reginald Lilly. Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1996.

Rest. Passivity. Inactivity. All speak of the absence of movement – the absence of activity – in common language. Yet, when I stand still is it really very different than when I am moving about? Is inactivity really the absence of activity?

Let us say I am walking down the street. I see a beautiful manikin in a storefront window with short, shoulder length, red hair. While it is true that I am no longer in motion – I no longer advance down the street, I still made a choice to stop at the particular storefront window and look in. In addition, I continue to look at the green eyes of the manikin, and advance no further. I arrest my movement and by doing so perform an action. Ignoring the activities related to moving my head and eyes, beating my heart and lungs, I stop, and stand, and therefore act.

It is no different when I awake in the morning. I can either get up, or stay in bed. Certain factors may make me more agreeable to one over the other, but I am still faced with a choice and must make one – even I choose not to make a choice I have made a choice; in this case I choose to stay in bed and close my eyes, hoping for another glimpse. People are, after all, told to ‘go get some rest’. This is clearly a request that an individual go do some action – go and lay down, slow your heart and breathing, and try to sleep.

It is important to note that the very choice is the action relevant, not the fact that some muscles move, while others do not. Of course, if we agree with the above then we must also say that every time we make a decision we act, and not just when we move our physical bodies. Since we make decisions about almost every moment, whether we recall it or not, combined with the moments in which we move we are always active.

Since activity implies reason – there must be some justification for the actions we take, and some cause for every motion – we could say that we are always acting towards some goal.

Since we are always acting towards some goal, we are also moving towards that goal in an attempt to achieve it – to fulfill it.

The fact that we are always acting towards some goal means that either we never achieve our goal, that our goal always changes, or that we have a plethora of goals that spring up one after the other.

If our goal always changes that either means that we have one fluid goal or that we have many transitory goals. Either way, that means that we can lower our number of choices in the paragraph above to two; we have one goal or we have many goals.

As far as many goals, it is never the case that we have more than one goal in site, immediately. That is, while I may have two goals in mind, I only work towards one at a time.

‘I want to get married and have two girls as beautiful as their mother.’  While two goals are present, one is really contained within the other. In this particular case, I cannot have two girls as beautiful as their mother if they have no mother. Since I am of the opinion that two people should be married if they want to start a family (and since two girl children sounds like a family to me) I would hope that I would get married before I have these two beautiful girls. So, while they both may be in mind, I must attain, and therefore work towards, one before the other.

My example seems to suggest, then, that we do not have one goal, or one changing goal. After all, I point towards the existence of two particular goals. Yet, one could argue that I am in fact not talking of two goals, but rather one multi-faceted goal. The question then becomes, have I always had this goal in mind? Clearly I have not, for there was once a time – when I was a child, for example – when I did not think of getting married and having children. And, something may occur in my future that will change my present goal(s).

Another example that comes to mind is the desire for wealth. Yet, it is not wealth that I really want, rather it is a pleasant life that I really desire. As soon as I get my wealth, and see that I am not happy, I find that wealth is simply a means towards an end. This example seems to suggest to me that my goal has changed. Yet, is it not as though my original goal was not fully what I wanted, but after modification it became so? While some may argue that it is not, it sounds as though my goals have changed in such a way it is as though I adopted a new goal.

Whether there is one changing goal or many different goals it does not really matter. What does matter is that I strive towards a goal (I can say this and it holds true even if we have multiple goals in our lifetime, for we can only actively pursue one at a time) when I am active. Since I am always active, I am always striving. Even if I were to accomplish my goal I would still be active (after accomplishment) and would still, therefore, be striving towards something else, even if it is towards enjoying the fulfillment of my goal (a short lived fulfillment for I must actively act within my ‘fulfilled state’ in order to say that I have accomplished, and still bask in the accomplishment of, my goal).

So, rest is activity. Passivity is activity. Even inactivity is activity, and is therefore not the absence of activity at all.

The following is meant to be an overview of The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology (1714), by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). My main interest in Leibniz is to see how his work relates to the works of Arthur Schopenhauer. Any notes that I make should be read with this in mind.

The Monadology consists of ninety short passages, numbered from 1 to 90. Some of the passages are only a line or so, while others are quite a few lines. The main focus of his piece is to discuss, in a condensed form, some of his philosophical principles. Only by reading his other works, along with this one, can one get a complete, or near complete, understanding of what Leibniz believes. Each line below is associated with a number, or numbers, which stand for each of the passages of Leibniz. I have tried to sum up, in as few words as necessary, what the main point of his passage is. It is my hope that, although the Monadology is already fairly short, this article will allow even a layperson to understand this work. However, my faith in my own ability to communicate these ideas with a layperson is lacking, and any assistance, by way of questions, would be greatly appreciated. Comments and critiques, which are always welcome and appreciated, can be sent to me at the email listed in the footer of this document, or in the space below.

1. A monad is a partless whole/object that combines with other wholes/objects to create wholes/objects that contain parts.

2. Monads must be because composites are collections of simples. Without simples, there could be no composites.

3. Monads do not extend, are shapeless, and are indivisible (monads cannot be broken into parts).

4-7. Composites can have their parts altered, but since monads have no parts, any influence upon a monad influences the whole monad – not an individual part of the monad.

8-9. However, monads must have properties and must be unique. If they did not have properties they would not be, since all things that are are some way. If they were not unique, they would not be natural, for no two things in nature are identical.

10. Everything, even monads, are subject to continual change.

11. From passages 7 and 10, changes to monads must come from within the monad, not from without.

12-13. Change involves a gradual passing from one state to another – something changes and something remains. All things, including monads, must therefore have multiple properties.

14. Perception is what changes in the monad.

15. Appetite is what brings about changes in perception.

16-17. Perceptions (and the necessary passing between perceptions) are all the monads contain.

18. Monads are perfect and sufficient since they contain all they need to act, internally.

19. Souls have, in addition to those properties prescribed to monads, more distinct perceptions as well as memory.

20. However, souls can be in a state much like a monad, but it does not last.

21. Perception, and perceptions, is, and are, the only property/properties of monads. A perception always exists – a great multitude of small, indistinct, perceptions can give the false impression that no perception exists.

22. Every present state is a consequence of the preceding state. “[T]he present is pregnant with the future.” [1: 71]

23. Even though it appears otherwise, there can never be a perception that did not arise from another – even before awakening from a deep sleep, we perceived.

24. Bare monads have no distinct perceptions, and therefore are as if in a deep sleep – without the impression of a perception.

25. Because nature has given animals five senses, which work together, animals are able to collect heightened perceptions.

26. Representations (or re-presentations) in memory give animals/souls a sequence which imitates reason, but not fully.

27. The magnitude and multitude of all the preceding perceptions influence present and future perceptions.

28. Men act like animals most of the time, following the mere sequencing of their memory. ‘The sun will rise tomorrow because it always has.’

29. It is the knowledge of eternal and necessary truths that distinguishes us from animals. It is this same knowledge that gives us reason and science. The rational soul, or mind, is what provides this knowledge.

30. It is this same rational soul, or mind, that allows us to reflect upon our actions – which allows us to consider the “I”.

31-32. Reasoning – science – is based upon the great principles of contradiction and sufficient reason. Contradiction tells us that if something is false, the opposite is true, and that if something is true, the opposite is false. The principle of sufficient reason tells us that a thing is a certain way only because there is sufficient reason for it to be that way – it could not be otherwise.

33-34. There are two kinds of truths. “The truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible; the truths of fact are contingent, and their opposite is possible.” [1:72] Truths of reasoning can always be broken down into simpler truths, which is how mathematical theorems are analyzed.

35. Simples ideas cannot be defined. Primitive principles cannot be proven, but need no proof.

36. Truths of fact – contingent truths – must also have sufficient reason. Truths of fact are the way that they are because of every motion (or event, or activity) that occurred before.

37. Since every reason needs a reason, we could forever move into the past, if every reason is within the sequence. In order to escape from the infinite sequence, there must be some initial reason with it’s own reason.

38-39. God is that primary/ultimate reason which contains, within itself, sufficient reason for diversity. Since this God is sufficient for all further reason, there need be only one God.

40. God, the ultimate/supreme substance, contains all of reality, since all that exists exists from it.

41. God is perfection because God is without limitation.

42-43. All animals derive perfection from God. All animals derive imperfection from their own limitation. In addition, everything derives existence from God – without God there would be nothing (no things) for God is the initial reason for all things, and therefore for all possible things (and for all possibility).

44-45. Possibility is grounded in that which is – what which exists. There must be at least one thing which, if possible, must also exist, and in this case it is the necessary being, or God.

46. Even though necessary truths could not be without God, they are not determined by God. Contingent truths are based upon the principle of the best.

47. From God came all initial monads.

48. God has power, knowledge, and will. Power is the source of everything, knowledge contains the diversity of ideas, and will brings about changes in accordance with the principle of the best. In other words, because God is the initial reason, and is therefore the source of all reason, God has power. Because the present is pregnant, and the past was pregnant, with the future, and the future is full of diversity, God has knowledge. Because contingent truths are based upon the principle of the best, and because contingent truths come from reason, God has will.

49. To be acted upon is imperfect, while the opposite is perfect. A monad has the attribute of action because it has distinct perceptions, while it is has the attribute of passion because it has confused perceptions.

50. One thing is more perfect than another if the one provides a reason for the existence of the other. The cause is more perfect than the effect.

51-52. Only God can allow, or cause, one monad to influence another. For this reason, God compares the two and finds reasons to allow influence of one over the other. “What is active in some respects is passive from another point of view: active insofar as what is known distinctly in one serves to explain what happens in another; and passive insofar as the reason for what happens in one is found in what is known distinctly in another.” [1: 75]

53-55. Since each choice allows a possibility, and since only one choice can be made, a reason must determine God towards one thing rather than another. This reason is based upon perfection – through God’s wisdom and goodness, he chooses that which is the best possibility.

56. The interconnection or accommodation of all created things to each other – the fact that all things are united in that one’s actions/activities end up influencing the actions/activities of another – means that each thing relates to everything, and is something like a mirror of the universe.

57. When a city is viewed from different directions the city appears to be completely different. In the same way, when the universe is looked at from different directions/perspectives, it looks as though the universe is different. However, it is not the universe that is different, rather it is the viewpoint.

58. By way of differing perspectives we achieve variety, but with order. This ordered variety allows the obtainment of as much perfection as possible.

59. The above – universal harmony allows the relation of each thing to every other thing – is the only hypothesis that adequately shows God’s greatness.

60. Monads are limited insofar as the degrees of their distinct perceptions – they are unable to see the whole as a whole, but can instead only focus upon the parts of the whole.

61. Because each monad has a relationship with each other monad, and since composite substances are composed of monads (or simple substances), composite substances are like simple substances, when it comes to activity. Influencing a part of the composite substance, in turn ends up influencing the whole substance. Since the present is pregnant with the past, one who sees everything could determine what will happen. But, souls can only see what is distinctly seen in itself, and cannot see into the infinite future.

62. While each monad is a mirror of the universe, it is first (or more distinctly) itself, a smaller part of the universe.

63. Bodies of living beings, together with a soul, constitute an animal. Each living body or animal belongs to a monad. Bodies of living beings or animals are always, like the universe, ordered/organized in a perfect way.

64. Each body of a living being/animal is like a natural automaton. Unlike an artificial automaton, where all parts, as parts, are not artificial, a natural automaton is always natural, in all of it’s parts. The difference between nature and artifact (which hear means any man made object) is that artifacts, at some point, consist of nature (the metals used, for example).

65. Each thing is “divisible to infinity” – each thing is “subdivided without end” – and each part has “some motion of their own”. [1: 78]

66-68. From this, every thing is like “a garden full of plants, and as a pond full of fish” – even taking a portion of a plant, or a drop of the pond, we still have another garden or pond. Even the very air is full, at a smaller level, or living beings – of plants and fish.

69. Only in appearance does something look dead in the universe.

70. Every part of the body of a living being is full of other living beings, which in turn have their own living beings.

71. All bodies are in constant change, just like rivers, with parts coming into, and exiting from, all the time.

72. The soul changes, therefore, the body only part by part, little by little. The soul is never completely without a body.

73. Generations are never completely new, but merely developments and growths. Deaths are simply diminutions.

74. The form of bodies comes from that which came before. The tree’s form comes from the seed that it grows from. In the same way, each body already has a soul – each body already has what it is to be contained within it.

75-77. The soul and, because the soul is a mirror of the universe, the universe are both indestructible. Because of this, animals are also indestructible. Animals merely change in part.

78-79. The soul and body each follow their own laws, but together work in unity. Souls act according to the laws of final causes – appetite, means, and ends. Bodies act according to sufficient reason and motion.

80-81. Souls can change the direction of bodies. The natural law of conservation states that the total direction in matter is preserved. According to the system of pre-established harmony, bodies and souls have no influence upon each other.

82. Minds, or rational souls, are like animals and living beings until they attain human nature by conception, by reasoning.

83-84. Minds are capable of knowing the system of the universe, and are capable of emulating it. This fact allows man to the ability to share a relationship with his creations like God with his creations.

85. The city of God is full of these like-minded minds, ruled over by God.

86. The glory of God depends upon the admiration of minds, and the knowledge of God’s greatness and goodness by minds.

87. Just as there is harmony between the soul and the body, there is harmony between the moral and the physical – between the city of God and the universe.

88-89. Life must be destroyed when the city of God requires it. Moral wrong must also have an effect upon the physical and moral right must have an effect upon the physical, but not necessarily (in either case) immediately.

90. Therefore, no good action goes unrewarded, no bad action goes unpunished. The world is as perfect as possible – it could not be any other way. The current state is the state determined by the most perfect of beings – God.

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Bibliography:

1. Leibniz, G.W.; Discourse on Metaphysics and Other Essays, Hackett Publishing Company, Indiana, 1991. Translated by Daniel Garber and Roger Ariew.
2. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm; Philosophical Writings, Everyman, London, 1995. Translated by Mary Morris and G.H.R. Parkinson.